Λίγα 24ωρα μετά την γιούχα των νοσταλγών του ναζισμού κατά 17χρονων
κοριτσιών και την αποθέωση του νταγλαρά με το δωδεκάποντο – συμπατριώτη
του χίτλερ, ένα τηλεγράφημα των Wikileaks έρχεται να αποκαλύψει μια
βρώμικη και απάνθρωπη συναλλαγή...
Συγκεκριμένα, Δανία – Τουρκία έκαναν μυστική συναλλαγή με σκοπό την
καταστροφή του Κουρδικού τηλεοπτικού καναλιού, που στήριζε τον αγώνα του
Κουρδικού λαού.
Το αντάλλαγμα; Η υποστήριξη της Τουρκίας στον Ρασμουσεν για αρχηγό του ΝΑΤΟ. Η μή άσκηση βέτο για την ακρίβεια.
Αδιαφανής συναλλαγή και ενδεικτική για το ποιόν της χώρας που
υποτίθεται πως κόπτεται για τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα. Ανθρώπινο δικαίωμα
είναι το εγγόνι του Χίτλερ να φορά μάσκαρα, αλλά όχι και το δικαίωμα του
Κουρδικου λαού για επιβίωση.
Classified
By: Charge d’Affaires a.i. Terence McCulley, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1.
(S) In recent discussions, Danish government officials and the chief
prosecutor in the case against PKK-affiliated Roj-TV underscored their
determination to address that case according to Danish law, expressing
frustration with the evidence produced so far and unwilling to predict
when the station may be taken to court. Danish
pledges to intensify efforts against Roj-TV — among the measures offered
Turkey for not blocking former PM Rasmussen’s appointment as NATO
secretary general — have given additional impetus to the investigation
while also prompting senior officials to tread carefully, to avoid the
appearance of a quid pro quo (i.e., sacrificing freedom of speech in
exchange for a high-level post). The Danes report, however, that
they are pursuing “new angles” to the case and would welcome the
opportunity to discuss them in greater detail with the anticipated U.S.
counterterrorism delegation (among these
“new angles” may be information developed through an informant and
alternative approaches on broadcasting content and tax evasion).
Denmark: No Interference with Judicial Process ——————————————— – 2. (S)
Shortly after the NATO Strasbourg Summit at which Rasmussen secured his
new post over Turkish objections, PM National Security Advisor Thomas
Ahrenkiel emphasized to us the importance of resolving the Roj-TV issue
through legal and intelligence channels. Ahrenkiel, who has stayed on as
NSA to the new prime minister, signaled that his office wanted to avoid
any suggestion of undue political pressure in the matter, and encouraged us to work directly with the chief prosecutor, Lise-Lotte Nilas.
When pressed a few weeks later by visiting U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kurt
Volker (reftel), Ahrenkiel acknowledged that he had not been keeping
his Turkish counterpart informed about the case, but (reluctantly, it
seemed) agreed to do so in light of growing Turkish concerns. The PM’s
office and the MFA remain wary of raising their profile on Roj-TV,
concerned about the domestic political fallout and potential damage to
the case itself. Stymied on Content, Still Looking for PKK Links
——————————————— — 3. (C) Prosecutor Nilas
and Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) Legal Advisor Lykke
Sorensen reviewed for us the status of the Roj-TV investigation
May 20, highlighting the case’s long history and ongoing challenges. The
initial focus, they recalled, had been to investigate Turkish
complaints based on Roj-TV’s broadcasting content. Twice
the Danish Radio and Television Board has ruled on the matter,
concluding — after reviewing television footage provided by Turkish
authorities — that Roj-TV’s programming did not incite hatred, violence
or otherwise corrupt minors, as alleged by Turkey. Rather, the Danish
board ruled, most recently in May 2007, that Roj-TV’s broadcasts
resemble those of other news organizations covering violence and
terrorist acts. Sorensen noted that, otherwise, sanctions could
be similarly applied to any news outlet that covered, for example,
terrorist bombings in Iraq or news of the latest al-Qaeda statement.
Nilas noted that the recent German court decision suspending the ban on
Roj-TV there made it that much more difficult to argue against the
station on content. 4. (S) Denmark’s criminal investigation of Roj-TV
has focused, meanwhile, on establishing institutional links between the
station and the PKK, especially on the financial side. Despite the
Danish police’s and tax authorities’ own efforts, intelligence provided
by the Turks and us, interdictions of suspected couriers and stepped-up
cooperation with EU partners (Nilas mentioned the Belgians, Germans and
French through EUROJUST), no clear evidence has been found to connect the broadcaster with the PKK.
Roj-TV has learned to be very careful over the years, evincing an open
and cooperative attitude toward occasional — and fruitless — reviews of
their books. Sorensen noted that Danish authorities aren’t even certain
which way the money flows are supposed to be going — is Roj-TV financing
the PKK, or is it the other way around? Communication with Turks
Improving, but Expectations Differ ——————————————— ————– 5. (C) The
Danes suggest that progress in the Roj-TV case has been hampered by
conceptual differences with the Turks (e.g., misunderstandings about
what constitutes protected speech, legal restraints on government
action) and by what the Danes perceive as lack of communication among
Turkish officials. Nilas reported that her discussions in April had been
positive, and she felt that she had made progress in explaining to the
Turks what specific evidence is needed to advance the case in Denmark.
For successful prosecution in Denmark, the state needs to show actual
incitement to acts of terror, and not simply news or editorializing, she
explained. Sorensen reported that the Danes continue to work directly
and through their liaison officer in Ankara to break through the
stovepiping in Turkish law enforcement, but communication remains a
challenge. 6. (C) We see that the Danes and the Turks are sometimes
talking past each other, or at least speaking based on greatly differing
expectations. Senior Danish officials seemed caught by surprise last
month when we told them that the Turks felt let down by Denmark’s
post-Strasbourg actions; former PM Rasmussen even suggested that he and
Turkish PM Erdogan had put the issue entirely behind them. Similarly,
Prosecutor Nilas could not be optimistic about taking Roj-TV to court,
refusing to speculate on a time frame, while the Turkish embassy here
told us they were “certain” that prosecution would begin within months —
supposedly based on their discussions with Nilas and the police. “New
Angles,” Warm Welcome for U.S. Team —————————————- 7. (S) Nilas and
Sorensen told us that the Danish authorities are looking at “new angles”
in the investigation and would be ready to discuss these in more detail
if and when another U.S. interagency team visits Copenhagen, ideally
sooner rather than later. Sorensen suggested that she preferred to limit these “new angles” to intelligence channels
for the time being, but she may have been referring to an informant the
police are supposedly working with, about which we have heard some
vague reports. Sorensen suggested that the Danish government may make another run at Roj-TV on tax issues, both in terms of possible evasion of payments and terror finance. 8. (S) Sorensen
brought up another avenue that has not yet been explored, and that is
to demonstrate that the broadcaster is consistently one-sided in its
presentation of information. Though not a criminal offense, such a
finding by the Danish Radio and TV Board could result in revocation of
the station’s license. Sorensen did not elaborate on how this
might be established or whether it has ever been done before. 9. (S)
Nilas and Sorensen were enthusiastic about a possible visit by U.S.
counterterrorism officials, indicating that they are eager to discuss
strategy and review efforts to improve coordination with Turkey. Both
recognized that new, “smoking-gun” information on Roj-TV’s PKK
connections was unlikely, but they said they would be grateful — as always — for any U.S. intelligence that could help the prosecution. Comment ——- 10. (S)
We are convinced that the Danes would welcome an opportunity to take
action against Roj-TV and rid themselves of this issue once and for all. We are equally certain, however, that they will not move without some new evidence or approach that can shield them against charges of trading principle for the former prime minister’s career. Danish officials are committed to reinvigorated efforts to close the station, to renewed trilateral cooperation with us and the Turks, but in strict accordance with Danish law. Rasmussen and his former government maintain that President Obama personally indicated understanding for this position
at Strasbourg, acknowledging the high political costs of an abrupt,
unjustified reversal. We recommend that we — beginning with the upcoming
visit of the S/CT-led delegation to Copenhagen — engage the Danes early
to review possible new lines of approach and encourage them to think creatively about ways to disrupt or close the station, should criminal prosecution prove unachievable in the short term. MCCULLEY
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