Ο ρόλος της Ρένας Δούρου Δυστυχώς, μέχρι σήμερα, έχει επαληθευθεί... γι αυτό και τον εμπιστεύομαι. Ευχομαι να μην επαληθευθεί και αυτή τη φορά, γιατί οι αποκαλύψεις και τα πρόσωπα που αναφέρει στο παρακάτω κείμενό του, θα αποτελέσουν ΔΟΥΡΕΙΟΥΣ ΙΠΠΟΥΣ στην παράδοση της Πατριδας μας σε Τουρκο - Ισραηλινά συμφέροντα.
Υ.Γ. Τα ντοκουμέντα στα οποία παραπέμπει ως πηγές ενημέρωσης, παρατίθενται στο τέλος της ανάρτησης.
Τά ἔχω θέσει κωδικοποιημένα καί ἀπολύτως κατανοητά ἀπό τόν Ἰανουάριο τοῦ '14, πρό τῶν "δρομολογούμενων" τριπλῶν ἐκλογῶν δηλαδή, γιά νἄχει ὁ...μέσος Χ.Α.λβᾶς - πολίτης - ψηφοφόρος μέτρο κρίσης τῶν κομμάτων καί τῆς συνολικῆς τους στάσης σέ ὅσα παρατέθηκαν, ὅπως καί νἄχουμε "ἐμεῖς" οϊ ὑπόλοιποι ΑΠΤΟ παράδειγμα τῶν ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΩΝ καί ΠΡΟΤΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ τοῦ...ΝΕΟ - ΡΑΓΙΑ ὅταν προσέρχεται στήν κάλπη, ἤτοι:...[..] 1. Πλήρης ἀπουσία Ἐθνικῆς Ἀγροτικῆς πολιτικῆς
2. Ἀποδόμηση τῶν ἐλαχίστων ὑπαρχόντων “ἐγγυήσεων” γιά τήν Ἀγροτιά καί τήν πρωτογενῆ παραγωγή.
3. Είσαγωγή
προγραμμάτων ἐπιδότησης γιά ἐπιχειρήσεις…”μανικιούρ – πεντικιούρ” καί τά ρέστα γιά…ἀγρότισσες καί λοιπές…τσελιγκοπούλες
4. Ὕπουλη ἐγκατάλειψη τῶν ἀγροτῶν καί ὑπόσκαψη κάθε σχετικῆς πρωτοβουλίας ἀντίδρασης – ἀνάκαμψης σέ τοπικό ἤ περιφερειακό ἐπίπεδο, ἰδιαίτερα σέ…Θράκη – Μακεδονία – Ἤπειρο – Δυτικό ἑλλαδικό βραχίονα
5. “Παραχώρηση” – παράδοση σέ Ziraat, Garanti καί λοιπά εὐαγῆ τουρκο – ισραηλινῶν, (κρατήστε τό δεύτερο…συνθετικό), συμφερόντων καί τῶν ἐθνικῶν στρατηγικῶν ὑποδομῶν καί ἐθνικῶν πόρων, μέ παράλληλη παράδοση – αἰχμαλωσία τῶν ἀγροτῶν καί τῶν ἀγροτικῶν καλλιεργειῶν ἤ/καί γεωργο – κτηνοτροφικῶν γαιῶν στίς παραπάνω περιοχές
6. Παράδοση – παραχώρηση σέ ὀβραιο – “ἐπενδυτές” μέσω…Σάλλα τοῦ συνόλου τῆς ὑποθηκευμένης ἀγροτικῆς γῆς (μοναδική διέξοδος – διαφυγή ἡ…προσφυγή τῶν ὑπερχρεωμένων ἀγροτῶν σέ Ziraato – Bank of Israel “λύσεις”…Γκαραντί λύση λέμε)
7. Παράλληλες καί σέ πλήρη ἐξέλιξη δέσμες “ἐπενδυτικῶν” δράσεων στίς παραπάνω περιοχές…στρατηγικοῦ ἐνδιαφέροντος σέ ὄτι ἀφορᾶ παραχώρηση – λεηλασία στρατηγικῶν ἐθνικῶν πόρων (βλ. BP, Third Point, Ratio Petroleum and…friends)
8. Συνολικός θανάσιμος…ἐναγκαλισμός – στραγγαλισμός στό σύνολο τοῦ Ἀνατολικο – Βορειο – Δυτικοῦ τόξου τῆς Πατρίδας μας, τῶν ἀγροτῶν καί/ἤ ἀγροτικῶν νοικοκυριῶν-ἐπιχειρήσεων, διά τῆς παραχώρησης – διαχείρησης – ἐλέγχου τοῦ συνόλου τῶν Ὑδάτινων Πόρων καί σχετικῶν Κρατικῶν – Δημοτικῶν ἐπιχειρήσεων (βλ. ΕΥΔΑΠ, ΕΥΑΘ, Πάτρα) σέ Ἰσραηλινούς “ἐπενδυτές” (βλ. Μεκόροτ and…”associates”). [..]
Καί γιά νά κάνουνε "σύνδεση" καί μέ τά περί Δούρου καί Μπενίση, δέν είναι τυχαῖο ὅτι ἡ Δούρου προωθήθηκε πολύ...διακριτικά ἀπό τό ΣΥΝΟΛΟ τῶν Κομμάτων στήν Περιφέρεια Ἀττικῆς, ὄπου, κατ' ἐπιταγήν τῶν...γνωστῶν καί σεσημασμένων ΑΦΕΝΤΙΚΩΝ της ἀπό ΙΣΡΑΗΛ καί ΠΑΤΡΩΝΕΣ τους, μεταξύ "ἄλλων" (πού θά πούμε ἄλλη φορά), ἔχει...ἐπιφορτιστεῖ μαζί μέ..Σταθάκη καί τό Σύστημα Παπακωνσταντίνου - Μανιάτη - Χατζηδάκη, τῆ..."ὑψιλῆ" ἐπιστασία Ντόρας καί περί αὐτήν (ξέρουμε "ΠΟΥ" καί μέ "ΠΟΙΟΥΣ" ἔφαγε στήν τελευταία ἐπίσκεψή της στό ΙΣΡΑΗΛ), νά φέρει σέ πέρας τό λεγόμενο...Takeover τῆς ΕΥΑΘ ἀπό ΕΥΔΑΠ γιά τήν δημιουργία ἑνός ίσχυροῦ οἰκονομικά φορέα πού θά προσελκύσει…"Ξένες ἐπενδύσεις"...
Τόν διακηρυγμένο πόθο ἀπό ἐποχῆς...Ἀριε Μέκελ, (ὅπου, πέραν τῶν ἄλλων θυμίζω, ὅτι οἱ συμφωνίες πού ὑπέγραψε ἐπί ἐποχῆς του ὁ Δούρειος Ἵππος "YOZMA", τό μεγαλύτερο Ἰσραηλινό Ἐπεν - Γδυτικό Κεφάλαιο, μέ τόν Χατζηδάκη, "ΤΡΕΧΟΥΝ" κανονικά καί δέν ἔχουν...καταγγελθεῖ ἀπό τήν παρούσα "κυβέρνηση" - ΠΙΟΝΙ τῶν Ἰσραηλινῶν τούς ΣΥΡΙΖΑΝΕΛ), τόν ὁποῖο "ΠΟΘΟ", συνεχίζω, ἀνέλαβε νά τόν κάνει πραγματικότητα ἡ νῦν Πρέσβυς Ἴριτ Μπέν Ἄμπα γιά τήν ὁποία ἔχω δώσει πολλά στοιχεῖα γιά τίς...ποικίλες "δράσεις" της σε΄..Ραμάλλα, Βηθλεέμ καί "ἀλλαχοῦ"...
Ρωτήστε (δῶστε βάση), ΠΟΣΕΣ ΜΥΣΤΙΚΕΣ ΣΥΝΑΝΤΗΣΕΙΣ - ΔΙΑΒΟΥΛΕΥΣΕΙΣ ἔχει κάνει ἡ ΜΠΕΝ ΑΜΠΑ καί τό "ΕΠΙΤΕΛΕΙΟ" της μέ παράγοντες τοῦ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟΥ ΑΝΑΠΤΥΞΗΣ και τόν ΙΔΙΟ τόν...ΣΤΑΘΑΚΗ;
Αὐτά πρός τό παρόν...
Τό θέμα, σέ συνδυασμό μά τά ἐνεργειακά, βλ. Eurasia Interconnector καί EastMed, ἔχει πάααρα πολύ..."ψωμί"...
Καί γιά νά...βοηθήσω ὅσους θέλουν νά ἐρευνούν καί νά άναλύουν, καί ὄχι, ὄπως εἰπαμε νά περιμένουν σάν...γκαβά πουλιά μασημένη τροφή, παραθέτω ἀμέσως παρακάτω καί δυό..."ΔΙΑΦΩΤΙΣΤΙΚΩΤΑΤΕΣ" Μελέτες...
Νάστε ὅλοι καλά...
...ΑΡΧΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ...OHNE GNADE
Ιsrael’s Options for Monetizing its Vast Reserves of Offshore Natural Gas in the Mediterranean Predicament
By Nicolas Mitsos and Michael J. Economides
h..p://www.coselle.com/resources/news/israel%E2%80%99s-options-monetizing-its-vast-reserves-offshore-natural-gas-mediterranean-predicament
[..] Geopolitical Implications
By starting with CNG, Israel can begin monetizing its offshore reserves within 24 months, generating more than $1 billion per year in net profits from the sale of 200 Bcf/year. The second phase of shipping 700 Bcf/year of LNG will generate an additional $4 billion or more in annual net profits.
The monetization of Israel’s offshore gas fields will have significant implications for Cyprus and Greece. Cyprus will cease using expensive and polluting fuel oil and diesel to generate electricity. Cyprus will avoid the huge cost for an LNG importation regasification plant that – now with the Israeli gas find – is superfluous, and instead Cyprus will earn profits as an exporter of LNG.
Greece will benefit by replacing oil-fired with lower cost gas-fired power plants on the islands, and it will generate perhaps $100 million per year in gas transit fees by using its national gas grid to transport gas to the Balkans and the EU. Furthermore, the prospect of closer energy-related commercial ties between Greece and Israel will draw support from the US, a development that may help Greece overcome its debilitating fiscal and economic crisis. [..]
GREECE HOPES FOR REVIVAL OF EAST MED PIPELINE PROJECT
h..p://www.naturalgaseurope.com/greece-israel-cooperation-east-med-pipeline-revival
«Revival»… …»Re» καί…»Vival».
Ο/Η Ανώνυμος άφησε ένα νέο σχόλιο για την ανάρτησή σας "Οι εβραίοι έβαλαν στο χέρι την ελληνική γη και καν...":
Israel’s Options for Monetizing its Vast Reserves of Offshore Natural Gas in the Mediterranean Predicament By Nicolas Mitsos and Michael J. Economides
The recent announcement by Houston-based Noble Energy and partners of a major natural gas find, the Leviathan field, in deep-water off Israel’s north coast suddenly elevates that country, entirely unexpectedly just a few years ago, into the group of major energy players. Israel’s US-method-reserves at Leviathan and at the nearby Tamar field are about 25 Tcf (trillion cubic feet). According to the US Geological Survey, the eastern Mediterranean is likely to hold 200 Tcf of recoverable gas. A reasonable estimate, based on proxy basin experiences, is that Israel’s offshore reserves will surpass 50 Tcf, comparable to the proven natural gas reserves of Libya and Egypt, and will rank Israel among the top 25 nations in reserves. Yet to be determined is how, and if, Israel will be able to monetize these vast reserves. Israel’s natural gas resources greatly exceed the amount it can use domestically. Even if Israel converted all of its future electricity generation (70 billion kWh per year) to natural gas-fired systems, it would use less than 0.5 Tcf/year.
If the country were to convert all its vehicles to use compressed natural gas or even to be electrified, it would still allow Israel to comfortably export 1 Tcf/year, most of which would likely go to Europe. Western Europe currently imports 10 Tcf/year of natural gas, 85% of which is delivered by pipeline and 15% by LNG. It is forecasted that Western Europe’s demand for imported natural gas will grow by 50% over the next two decades. Israel’s 1Tcf/year of exports will easily be absorbed by Europe, and it will generate at least $6 billion per year of net income (at current market prices) for Israel and its E&P partners. Israel’s natural gas sales can satisfy 7% of its annual national budget. The Problem with Pipelines
One option is for Israel to export natural gas via a new overland pipeline traversing Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and/or Iraq before passing through Turkey to access the European pipeline in Bulgaria and Greece. It is unlikely however that Israel will accept the political risk of transporting its natural gas through those Middle Eastern neighbors. Another possibility being considered is an undersea pipeline. In August the Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, visited Athens and reportedly suggested building a pipeline between Israel’s offshore fields and the Greek mainland. Such a pipeline would be the most challenging project of its type ever attempted. It would be the world’s deepest undersea natural gas pipeline with long stretches at depths of 2,000 meters over rugged terrain and the Eastern Mediterranean Ridge. Covering 1,040 kms from Leviathan to the access point near Athens, the pipeline would match the length of the world’s longest undersea pipeline (or exceed it by 200 kms if the pipeline is routed to the access point in northern Greece). If an undersea pipeline from Leviathan to the Greek mainland with capacity of 1 Tcf/year were to be built, its costs can be inferred from the trans-Mediterranean pipeline recently commissioned between Libya and Sicily (“GreenStream”), which also was a challenging engineering project. GreenStream is 520 kms long, has a maximum depth of 1,100 meters, a pipeline diameter of 32” and a capacity of 280 Bcf/year.
It was built six years ago at a cost of $6.6 billion, or for $13 million/km. A pair of 32” pipelines from Leviathan to the Greek mainland would be twice as deep, twice as long, transporting 2½ times the volume of gas as GreenStream. The construction costs are likely to be around $25 million/km (assuming that formidable engineering challenges can be overcome). Adding in the cost of tripling the capacity of the Greek pipeline system to handle 1 Tcf/year, the estimated capital cost for pipelines from Leviathan to the northern Greek border would exceed $30 billion.
This capital cost leads to an ongoing cost of up to $5/MMBtu, absent large subsidies, to deliver 1 Tcf/year of Israeli gas from Leviathan to the European gas grid. At current market prices for Russian gas at the German border, a transport cost of $5/MMBtu plus at least $1.00/MMBtu in transit fees leaves a small amount of net income for the Israelis and their partners. A more cost-effective way for Israel to export natural gas to Europe is via ship. Phase One: CNG
As a first phase of monetization for a volume of perhaps 200 Bcf/year of gas from Leviathan or Tamar, Israel should use CNG (compressed natural gas) ships. As soon as the fields are ready to produce natural gas for export, the first step is to situate above the fields a large deep-water FPSO to receive gas from the wellheads and to separate liquids.
Large FPSOs can be configured to handle 500 MMscf/day. The gas then will be loaded on to one or more large CNG vessels per day that will shuttle between the FPSO and destinations in Cyprus and Greece. Cyprus at only 150 kms away is an obvious candidate for CNG from the FPSO. Cyprus seeks to use natural gas instead of fuel oil and diesel to generate electricity, and its current needs are for 35 Bcf/year. CNG from Leviathan or Tamar will provide Cyprus with natural gas at the lowest costs, enabling Cyprus to reduce electricity generation costs by 50%. It will also enable Cyprus to avoid building a costly but now unnecessary LNG regasification terminal.
Another 35 Bcf/year of CNG can be distributed to off-grid Greek islands currently using fuel oil or diesel to generate electricity. The remaining 130 Bcf/year can be transferred to the Greek national pipeline system, which has total spare capacity of 140 to 180 Bcf/year that can be used to supply gas to the Balkans and the EU through south-to-north backhaul flows and through gas swaps. By starting with CNG as Phase 1, Israel can begin monetizing its offshore natural gas within 24 months. Total capital costs for the CNG system will be approximately $2.5 billion, including the FPSO and a fleet of CNG ships transporting 500 MMscf/day to Cyprus, the Greek islands and the Greek mainland.
All-in costs of shipping including capital costs will be around $3/MMBtu. At current market prices to European end users of $9/MMBtu, Israel and its E&P partners will be able to generate more than $1 billion of net income per year from CNG, which probably will be the most profitable sales of Israeli natural gas. Phase Two: LNG Processing in Cyprus
To export an additional 700 Bcf/year, Israel’s most viable option is LNG (liquefied natural gas). GTL (gas-to-liquid fuel using Fischer-Tropsch technologies) is a possibility, but LNG is the less risky method for monetizing such large amounts of gas. An LNG plant consisting of two 7 million MT/year trains will produce 700 Bcf/year of gas, at a capital cost of approximately $12 to $15 billion. Included in the project would be the construction of an undersea pipeline from Leviathan to the liquefaction plant. Israel can build its liquefaction plant in Israel. But the better option is to construct the marine port and liquefaction plant in Cyprus, which is almost as close as the Israeli coast to the Leviathan field. An advantage of Cyprus is that it is a full member of the European Union benefitting from preferential terms for importing into other EU countries, and the political situation in the country supports large-scale, long-term investments.
There also are possibilities for EU and Cypriot government grants for the project. It will require five or more years for Israel and Cyprus to start LNG production. At current market prices, Israel and its E&P partners can expect $4 billion per year in net profits from LNG sales. Geopolitical Implications
By starting with CNG, Israel can begin monetizing its offshore reserves within 24 months, generating more than $1 billion per year in net profits from the sale of 200 Bcf/year. The second phase of shipping 700 Bcf/year of LNG will generate an additional $4 billion or more in annual net profits.
The monetization of Israel’s offshore gas fields will have significant implications for Cyprus and Greece. Cyprus will cease using expensive and polluting fuel oil and diesel to generate electricity. Cyprus will avoid the huge cost for an LNG importation regasification plant that – now with the Israeli gas find – is superfluous, and instead Cyprus will earn profits as an exporter of LNG.
Greece will benefit by replacing oil-fired with lower cost gas-fired power plants on the islands, and it will generate perhaps $100 million per year in gas transit fees by using its national gas grid to transport gas to the Balkans and the EU. Furthermore, the prospect of closer energy-related commercial ties between Greece and Israel will draw support from the US, a development that may help Greece overcome its debilitating fiscal and economic crisis. πηγη
Greece Hopes for Revival of East Med Pipeline Project
A high level delegation headed by Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, along with members of his Ministerial cabinet, visited Israel on the 8th of October. Various memorandums and agreements were signed and a East Mediterranean gas pipeline project revival looks likely.
Greece's Minister of Environment, Energy and Climate Change Ioannis Maniatis relayed to his counterpart in Israel, Silvan Shalom, that Athen's foremost interest is to push forward the East Med energy corridor via a tripartite cooperation between Greece, Cyprus and Israel, in which natural gas will play a key role.
The main argument used was the geo-economic link between the Middle East and the EU, in times of major crises in the region and the need for Europe to diversify its gas import supplies.
As such, a pipeline running offshore Israel to Europe through Greece would stabilize the area and cement a decade’s long export market for the companies involved.
Minister Shalom replied that if a pipeline is indeed built, he would prefer it to pass through Greece rather than Turkey, which is in essence another antagonist for the corridor route and a major domestic gas consumer market.
For the time being Tel Aviv is considering several options, without having decided on the best policy to follow concerning its significant offshore gas reserves, which may even exceed 800 bcm.
Options being discussed at various political and economic levels in Israel include a pipeline straight into Southern Turkey that will then connect with the local transmission system that will soon add TANAP to its array of pipeline routes.
A second option would be the afrementioned pipeline to Cyprus, connecting local offshore reserves before ending in Southern Greece to connect with the local pipeline network that will add TAP in its capacity by 2019.
Moreover the establishment of an LNG station in Israel is being considered, either in Haifa for exports to European markets, or in Eilat, with an eye for lucrative Asian-Pacific markets.
Lastly is the option for the construction of an LNG terminal in Cyprus where all the East Med gas will be stored before being re-exported to (mostly) EU destinations.
It should be noted that Israel has not assessed the amounts of gas to be exported in total over the coming years, and what amounts should be kept for domestic consumption.
In fact, this is a crucial aspect of the entire discourse because for a long-term investment project of around 30 years, hundreds of billions of cubic meters are going to be needed, which decreases considerably the local reserves and the capacity of Israel to fully proceed into mass scale gasification programs for domestic use.
A pipeline to Turkey is estimated to cost €3 billion, while the one to Greece around € billion. Greece's DEPA recently awarded a feasibility study to JP Kenny that concluded a pipeline of 1200km with an 8 bcm annual capacity would cost at least €4.7 billion and identified three basic scenarios for the route of the project:
Route offshore Cyprus to the Island of Crete and then to Southern Greece
Directly offshore Israel to Crete and Southern Greece
Terminal on mainland Cyprus to Crete and mainland Greece
In all cases the projects of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) are mentioned as linked to the East Med pipeline and where DEPA places its priority on persuading the Israeli side into joining the project.
Presently the situation is in flux and the Israelis will take their time deciding on which route to place their bets.
Key factors that will influence such decisions are not purely economic but geopolitical and security related due to the peculiar state of affairs in Israel, in the midst of chaotic developments in the Arab world and in light of the war in Syria, the Iranian nuclear program and its rift with Turkey.
Consequently, it could be said that signs of the direction to be followed are not expected until early 2014.
πηγη
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